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Abstract 
 
Solving the problems associated with identity management in the “virtual” world is 
proving to be one of the keys to full realization of the economic and social benefits of 
networked information systems. By definition, the virtual world lacks the rich 
combination of sensory and contextual cues that permit organizations and individual 
humans interacting in the physical world to reliably identify people and authorize them 
to engage in certain transactions or access specific resources. Being able to determine 
who an online user is and what they are authorized to do thus requires an identity 
management infrastructure. Some of the most vexing problems associated with the 
Internet (the deluge of spam, the need to regulate access to certain kinds of content, 
securing networks from intrusion and disruption, problems of inter-jurisdictional law 
enforcement related to online activities, impediments to the sharing of distributed 
computing resources) are fundamentally the problems of identity management. And yet, 
efforts by organizations and governments to solve those problems by producing and 
consuming identity systems may create serious risks to freedom and privacy. Thus the 
implementation and maintenance of identity management systems raises important 
public policy issues. 
 
The identity management systems (the IMS-s) often tend to require more information 
from the consumers than would otherwise be necessary for the authentication purposes. 
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The typical choice being analyzed in IMS is the one between a completely centralized 
or integrated system (one ID - one password, and a single sign-on) and the one 
comprising a plethora of (highly) specialized IMS-s (multiple ID-s and passwords). 
While the centralized system is the most convenient one, it is also likely to require too 
much personal information about the users, which may infringe on their rights to 
privacy and which definitely will result in serious damage should this personal 
information be stolen and/or abused. When more than two IMS-s interconnect (more of 
a practical side with various types of commercial values), they share the private 
information with each other, thus increasing consumers’ exposure to possible 
information misuse. It is thus rather obvious that the public policy plays an important 
role to maintain the structure of identity management systems ensuring the existence of 
a sound balance between the authentication requirements and consumers’ rights to 
privacy. The focus of this paper is on investigating this type of tradeoff by employing a 
theoretical framework with agents whose utility depends on the amount of private 
information revealed, and on making policy recommendations related to the issue of 
interconnection between alternative IMS-s. Our model derives optimal process of 
interconnection between IMS-s in the simple case of three IMS-s, then generalizing it to 
the case of more than three firms. The socially optimal outcome of the interconnection 
process in our model implies encouraging the interconnection between smaller rather 
than larger IMS-s. 
 
JEL-Codes: L14, D85, D78, L25, L43, L51 
Keywords: Networks, Interconnection, Identity Management, Regulation Policy 
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I. Introduction 
 
Diverse as they are in terms of both scale and scope, the provision of almost all 
online services involves soliciting personal information from the customers. In 
fact, as the information technology progresses, more and more personal 
information is being collected from the consumers (Bennett, 1992.) Thus, the 
insurance companies want to know one’s age, marital status and smoking 
habits, while credit card companies are concerned whether one has ever 
defaulted on his or her debt. The mortgage company is interested in the size of 
one’s annual income and the online music store is anxious to know about your 
music tastes. Becoming a client of this or that service provider thus typically 
involves disclosing some sort of personal (private) information, which naturally 
raises concerns for privacy. Consumers are often unaware of the reuse and 
disclosure of personal information they provide to others during daily 
transactions. 
 
Naturally, when an organization such as a business or the Government gets 
hold of the citizens’ personal information, it gives them some sort of power of 
control over these individuals’ lives. In particular, by learning more information 
about an individual may result in the information-soliciting party to extract more 
of the individual’s consumer surplus. Indeed, whereas in the more classical 
treatment the price-discriminating firms or agencies had to design self-selecting 
contracts in order to charge each type their most appropriate price, the same 
sort of discrimination can be carried out by simply making an individual fill out a 
questionnaire, either in paper or online. Obviously, the increasing presence of 
online services makes the process of collecting such personal information much 
easier. 
 
This paper presents an attempt at economic analysis of the privacy issues. The 
concept of privacy was introduced in the literature almost four decades ago in 
Westin (1967): “Privacy is the ability of individuals to exercise control over the 
disclosure and subsequent uses of their personal information.” Gavison's (1980) 
definition is more straightforward and consists of three elements: secrecy ('the 
extent to which we are known to others'), solitude ('the extent to which others 
have physical access to us') and anonymity ('the extent to which we are the 
subject of others' attention').The importance of privacy protection has received 
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special recognition with the issue of the OECD’s guidelines on privacy 
published in the year of 1980 (OECD, 1980). In particular, these guidelines 
identified the unlawful or inaccurate storage of personal data, abuse or 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information as violation of fundamental 
human rights. The report concluded that there should be some constraints as to 
the personal information to be collected by (government) organizations and 
firms alike, such as the solicited personal data should be relevant to the 
purposes which they are being collected for. At the same time the report 
acknowledged the existence of a tradeoff between the extent of privacy and the 
minimal amount of control over the information-providing citizens. That such 
control is necessary becomes clear once one thinks about the issues of identity 
theft, secure access to online banking and the like. 
 
It is becoming a common business practice to provide services together with a 
note on privacy policy that typically guarantees that the information solicited 
from the customer either explicitly (through e.g. the questionnaires) or implicitly 
(by keeping record of customers’ purchases in individual profiles) will not be 
sold to the third parties or otherwise abused. Moreover, as an alternative to the 
centralized depositories of private information such as Microsoft Passport online 
industry-backed organizations like Liberty Alliance (backed by the Sun 
Microsystems and Intel, among others) have developed a federated 
authentication procedure such that the businesses affiliated with the Alliance 
only get access to the information on an individual necessary for each particular 
transaction rather than the whole file of information on a person. 
 
Recent surveys have found that four out of five Net users are concerned about 
threats to their privacy when they are online (Hansen and Berlich, 2003). Yet 
only 6% of them have actually experienced privacy abuses. If electronic 
commerce is going to thrive, this fear is going to have to be dealt with by laws 
and by industry practices. This paper argues that such laws are indeed 
necessary since our results suggest counting on the industry to regulate itself is 
not necessarily conducive to the socially optimal outcome 
 
In this study we present a model that formalizes the concepts that are being 
widely used in a fairly loose way, such as ‘personal information’, ‘identity 
management’ and ‘privacy’. We postulate that the amount of services 
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consumers obtain is directly proportional to the amount of personal information 
they reveal to the third parties. Consumers’ privacy concerns are modeled as 
that amount of personal information they disclose beyond which their anxiety 
related to possible information misuse outweighs the benefits from enjoying 
more services whose provision is made possible due to more disclosure of 
personal information. The existence of such privacy threshold imposes certain 
constraints on the behavior of both policy makers and service providers. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a discourse on the 
concept of identity and identity management systems. Section III provides an 
overview of the literature on the subject. Section IV proceeds with setting up a 
formal framework for analyzing the issues of identity management. Section V 
derives and analyzes the outcomes predicted by the model developed in the 
previous section. Section VI summarizes the paper and offers several policy 
implications. 
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II. Identity and Identity Management Systems1 
 
To our knowledge, there has been no commonly accepted definition of identity 
so far. The way the concept is being viewed and perceived differs widely 
depending on the context and the academic area. In very general terms, the 
concept of identity can be said to emphasize the difference between an 
individual and a person (Mead, 1934). The way any person is interacting with 
the society is in many instances the way his or her identity interacts with the 
social system. In other words, the concept of a person may consist of a plethora 
of individuums each one carrying a particular identity, or equivalently, each 
person may possess multiple identities (Lehnhardt, 1995). 
 
In this study we are interested in developing a framework for analyzing the 
process of interaction of a person (and hence, his identities) with the social 
system(s) in a well-defined, formal way. For that reason, out of all the multitude 
of the definitions of identity we limit ourselves to the usage of digital identity for 
online identity. The term digital identity refers to the process of the attribution of 
properties to a person, which can be technically formalized, listed and put into a 
readily accessible digital form, hence the name of the concept. One’s digital 
identity can be a single E-mail address or a list of answers to the questions like 
“What is your age?” or “Are you married?”. Clarke (1999) elaborates on the 
concept of digital identity in the following way: “Digital identity is the means 
whereby data is associated with a digital persona. Organizations which pursue 
relationships with individuals can generally establish an identifier for use on its 
master file and on transactions with or relating to the individual. […] There are 
three approaches whereby a digital identity can be constructed from multiple 
sources: a common identifier, multiple identifiers, correlated; and multi-
attributive matching.” 
 
Up until recent developments in the area of automatic management of personal 
data such as electronic banking, on-line filling out of tax forms, e-commerce and 
loan applications, to name just a few, the most broadly accepted definition of 
legal person is “a human being to which the legal system refers rights, 
privileges and obligations” (Kelsen, 1966). However, as it is becoming 
                                            
1 Discussion in this section largely relies on the study by the Independent Centre for 
Privacy Protection, 2003. 
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increasingly easier to get access to and manipulate substantial amounts of 
personal data, and hence abuse them, the individual identity, including the 
digital one, started to receive protection from the main legal sources, such as 
constitutions, international treaties (e.g. treaties of the European Union and its 
directives), national laws and other international regulations. 
 
Among the many aspects of regulating the use of one’s personal data, the issue 
of giving the personal data owner (i.e. a person) the most control possible on its 
own identity and personal data has been receiving increasingly more attention 
Thus, the European Directive 95/46/CE about data protection postulates the 
following principles for providing each person with these rights:  
 Personal data must always be processed fairly and lawfully 
 Personal data must be collected for explicit and legitimate purposes and 
used accordingly 
 Personal data must be relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purpose for which they are processed 
 Data that identify individuals must not be kept longer than necessary 
 Appropriate technical and organizational measures should be taken 
against unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data 
 
In our everyday lives we face various environments that require us to present 
our identities, or in other words, reveal our personal data at least to some extent. 
These environments can be civic administration, supermarkets, schools, offices 
and shopping malls. Even if the personal information we reveal in those 
environments does not necessarily uniquely identifies or reveals everything 
about us, frequently this information is capable of giving an indication of who we 
really are, giving potential scope to discovering more information about us 
compared to what we actually have revealed. For example, it is prohibited by 
law in the U.S. to ask for one’s marital status in a credit card application. 
However, this same application requires other information such as name and 
physical address, if combined with the easily accessible public records such as 
Lexis-Nexis, will provide information on one’s marital status just as easily. This 
single particular example illustrates the more general principle (ICPP 2003): “In 
general it is not possible to successfully manage one’s partial identities without 
knowing when and where they may be involuntarily disclosed. This is not only 
the case with data trails in digital networks, but also capturing biometrics, e.g. 
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by video surveillance, is often possible without knowledge and consent of the 
individual.” 
 
As mentioned before, our personal data can be used in various context and 
fashions by various business and public entities such as shops and tax offices. 
In order for these entities to manage the data on our personal identities, 
especially the digital ones, they need to employ identity management systems. 
As is the case with the concept of identity, there is a variety of the definitions of 
identity management systems (the IMS). In this study we understand the IMS to 
be an infrastructure within one or between several organizations, which have 
agreed upon a mutual model of trust in managing and using identities. This 
definition also includes an implementation of identity management 
encompassing a whole society. (ICPP 2003). 
 
We concentrate on the relationship between a person (possibly with multiple 
identities) and an organization that employs identity management systems 
(such as a shopping mall or a tax office). In general, one can represent such a 
relationship as a digital transaction between a user and an organization, e.g. an 
e-commerce or an e-government service provider, offering its digital services. In 
this type of digital transactions, the issue of privacy protection and anonymity 
emerge to be very important. Whenever sensitive data such as credit card 
numbers or medical records are to be transmitted through the Internet, users 
often balk away from submitting their data electronically for fear of these data 
being stolen or misused, the latter including using these data in the way not 
intended by the users. Most people would therefore like to individually control 
what data will be transmitted to whom and for what purpose. However, since 
providing the users with such freedom often lies outside the scope of incentives 
of the services providers, we believe it is the scope of the government policy to 
constrain the freedom of the information-collecting agencies so as to comply 
with the basic guidelines on individual rights and freedoms.
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III. A Brief Overview of the Literature on Digital Identity Management 
 
Designing policies aimed at regulating the type and/or the amount of personal 
information solicited from individuals is commonly referred to as identity 
management (Clarke, 2004). Although identity management has many aspects 
to it (e.g. prevention of identity theft or development of authentication 
requirements), we concentrate on the issue of multiple identities, or alternatively, 
the issue of the optimal choice of the structure of the identity management 
systems. Our choice is motivated by two factors. First, most existing literature 
on identity management concentrates on the supply-side of the phenomenon, 
such as security of access, authentication algorithms etc. Second, despite of 
the postulated necessity (OECD, 1980) for the consumers to be able to control 
the process of collecting and using their personal data, consumers are as yet 
not able to exercise sufficient control over the information they disclose. One 
reason behind the latter might be that the only lobbying party with respect to 
identity management appears to be the representatives of identity management 
systems themselves who are naturally interested in soliciting as much 
information from the consumers as possible. In particular, the issue of multiple 
identities has been receiving a considerable amount of attention in recent years. 
The focal point of discussion is the choice between an all-encompassing single 
identity management system that knows everything about everyone on one side 
of the IMS spectrum and a multitude of highly specialized small IMS-s that 
perform narrowly defined operations and solicit minimum information from each 
individual at a time. Such keen attention to the issue appears to be primarily 
caused by the fact that individuals as well as businesses get increasingly more 
concerned about the way their personal information is being solicited and used. 
Thus, the Microsoft Passport IMS fell far short of the expectations of its creators 
because consumers did not like the idea of a lot of personal information about 
themselves collected from different places be stored in one place on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, businesses who foresaw such unwillingness to 
take place were unwilling to pay thousands of dollars a year for access to the 
Passport services. Another salient example is the recent debates on the 
introduction of a single identifier in the countries of European Union and 
Australia. Especially in the latter case, recognizing all of the perils associated 
with multiple identities abuse, the Australian government has forsaken the idea 
of a uniform omnipotent identity card for its citizens. 
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An example of how unregulated interconnection may infringe on a individual’s 
privacy is given by Davis (2000). While the U.S. law forbids soliciting 
information on race and marital status by the credit issuing agencies, such 
information can be fairly easily obtained by the credit agency since this is 
contained public records (e.g. Lexis-Nexis) that require the very basic 
information such as name and address for access. It is rather obvious that 
national governments have an important role to play in maintaining the structure 
of identity management systems ensuring the existence of a sound balance 
between the authentication requirements and consumers’ rights to privacy (JHU, 
2003). While it appears natural that more safety in transactions involving 
personal identification requires more information on consumers’ identity (see e.g. 
Ogata et al., 2004) consumers will be also likely to be more reluctant to reveal 
their personal data as they are required for more such data to be revealed 
(Olivero and Lund, 2004). The focus of this paper is on investigating this type of 
tradeoff by employing a theoretical framework with agents whose utility depends 
on the amount of private information revealed, and on making policy 
recommendations related to the issue of interconnection between alternative 
IMS-s. 
 
Clarke (2004) notes that “Many scheme designers fail to demonstrate any 
appreciation of the need that individuals have to sustain many identitites, and to 
avoid linkage among them.” The existence of multiple identities is often frowned 
upon as an inconvenience to individuals (hence the introduction of Microsoft 
Passport for example), with the role of multiple identities as a means of 
protecting people’s privacy often overlooked. PINGID: “The issue is how to 
manage the linkage or sharing multiple identities.” Liberty Alliance: “to gain 
access to portions of the user’s identity information that may be distributed 
across multiple providers.” Proponents of sharing: “consumers are concerned 
about need to have to remember multiple username/password pairs; consumers 
are concerned about re-authentication requirements; want dealings with 
multiple organizations to be seamless.” Clarke 2004: “Consumers would like to 
avoid being subjected to large amounts of personal data disclosure, and that 
are able to continually add to that data in order to locate and track them.”  
 
We judge on the social desirability of alternative IMS structures by comparing 
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the values of total consumer utility accruing to each one of the alternatives. We 
model consumers’ utility as a function of the extent of revealed partial identity 
(Clauss and Kohntopp, 2001) and build on the network interconnection model 
by Heal and Kunreuther (2002) to model incentives of the identity management 
firms. The resulting theoretical model yields several inferences and policy 
implications stemming from the predicted relationship between private and 
social optima with respect to the interconnection issue. 
 
Since there clearly is a tradeoff between the extent to which privacy is protected 
and the effectiveness with which the Government is able to control individuals’ 
actions, privacy must be compromised to a certain degree. Or, as the Open 
Group put it, “… the desire for privacy and individual dignity must be reconciled 
with the desire for effective government and with legal needs and national 
security needs.” (Open Group) Limited acceptance of Microsoft Passport due to 
“the reluctance of the public to trust any single organization to provide a 
universal identity management solution, reinforced by the fact that security 
question marks have been raised relating to the specific Passport 
implementation.” (Open Group) Hansen et al. (2003) “On the one hand, in 
particular legal contexts reliable identification of a person is necessary; and, on 
the other, the structuring and representation of identity is based in human rights 
law.” 
 
In this study we are looking for the scope for balanced solutions to the problem 
of identity management focusing on the issue of interconnection between 
alternative IMS firms. We are especially interested in identifying the type of 
environment in which the individual incentives of IMS firms push them to 
interconnect in a way that is socially suboptimal. Designing policies for this type 
of environment is a challenging goal for the policy makers that can be better 
achieved when backed by a better understanding of the economic processes 
behind interconnection. 
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IV. Incentive Structure of Consumers and IMS Firms 
 
Clarke (1994) suggests there exists an important difference between the real 
world of physical existence and an abstract world of information. Physical 
entities (such as people or organizations) possess attributes (such as name and 
age). In the same way as people perform many roles in different contexts, a 
physical entity poses as a different identity in each type of these contexts. For 
example, the same man can be a client of his bank, an employee of his boss, a 
goalkeeper in the football team etc. Each one of the roles this man plays is 
associated with different sets of attributes such as credit history, number of cars 
sold or the amount of goals kept. In this way, an entity may have more than one 
identity associated with it. 
 
Following Heal and Kunreuther (2002), we postulate that consumers are 
completely identified by a set of informational atoms ia  belonging to set A  
called one’s complete (or full) identity. Any subset of A is called partial identity. 
Partial identity can be thought of as a piece of personal information an individual 
is willing to reveal in order to obtain a specific type of service provided by an 
information management system. We assume that the amount of services 
provided for the consumer by an IMS firm is equal to the extent to which a 
consumer has revealed her partial identity to the IMS firm. To be more explicit, 
we impose that the maximum amount of the provided services is equal to the 
norm of the information set A  which for simplicity we take to be the interval of 
[0,1]. 
 
Denote S  to be the set of all information services is  that cannot be split any 
further. An IMS is defined as an entity that exchanges any set of elementary 
information services is  for consumers’ partial identities, that is, subsets of A . 
Each service si is assigned a numerical value from [0,1] such that (without loss 
of generality) the sum of all is -s is normalized to 1. 
 
Connecting to an IMS produces two effects. Getting access to a subset of S  
associated with any given IMS delivers certain utility. On the other hand, 
disutility results as well since consumers are aware of the risks associated with 
possible misuse of their private information. We thus represent our utility 
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function as composition of utility and disutility of revealing information with the 
general property that  
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
*
,
,
j i j i
j i i j
U s U s s s s
U s U s s s s
 > > >

< < <
                                            (1) 
 
 
where *s  is the threshold of privacy disclosure beyond which the disutility 
effect caused by privacy concerns starts dominating the positive utility effect 
caused by the increase in provided informational services. Utility function (1) 
can be thought of as reflecting both utility and disutility effects produced by 
disclosing a certain amount of private information. A construct similar to (1) is 
the decreasing deadline utility function used in health economics (Murthy and 
Sarkar, 1997). Alternatively, revealing partial identity can be thought of as the 
combined consumption of goods (the services provided by IMS-s) and bads 
(risk of misuse of information, identity theft and the like). 
 
The population as a whole consumes all of the available information services. 
The amount of private information (partial identity) that each consumer reveals 
to any single IMS is directly proportional to the amount of information services 
provided to her in exchange, so that consuming more services entails revealing 
more partial identity. We assume that the number of consumers connected to 
each IMS is directly proportional to the amount of services this particular IMS 
provides. There are two ways in which we rationalize this assumption. First, it is 
unlikely that smaller IMS-s will provide a wide array of services due to e.g. lack 
of economies of scale and scope. Second, a wider array of services will likely to 
be designed in such a way as to serve various types of consumers in order to 
cater to a wider segment of the population, naturally increasing the market 
share of the IMS with a wide array of services. For that latter reason, latter firms 
will need to solicit more private information from the consumers so as to be able 
to discern between the types. 
 
In line with the main conclusions of the literature on price discrimination, the 
firms that know more about their customers’ types will be able to extract a wider 
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fraction of their consumer surplus. Since using the IMS services in our model is 
costless, consumers’ utility from connecting to an IMS is equal to consumer 
surplus. Without loss of generality we assume that the IMS firms extract all 
consumer surplus. 
 
In order to impose more structure on the consumers’ utility function described 
above, we postulate a quadratic form as follows: 
 
( ) 2U s as bs= − +         (2) 
 
where 0, 0a b> > 2. Recall that apart from measuring the amount of consumed 
information services, s  is also proportional to the market share of the IMS that 
provides these services. Since this function reaches its maximum at *
2
b
s
a
= , 
more privacy-conscious consumers will be characterized by a lower ratio of b
a
. 
 
Interconnection between any two IMS-s in our model produces two effects. First, 
as mentioned already, the firms share private identities of their existing 
customers with each other. Second, interconnection results in a greater market 
share commanded by the two interconnected IMS together. Thus, if IMS1 
commanding market share 1s  interconnects with IMS2 that enjoys market share 
2s  the new IMS resulting from the interconnection of the previous two will 
command market share 1 2s s+ . 
 
In our framework, if an IMS is commanding a market share of s  for a group of 
consumers characterized by parameters a  and b in (2), its payoff ( )P s  is 
defined as: 
 
( ) ( )2P s s as bs= − +         (3) 
                                            
2 Specification (2) can be thought of as the second-order Taylor approximation of the 
composition of utility and disutility effects. In this way (2) accommodates any utility 
function where the former effect dominates first, while the latter dominates later. 
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Payoff function (3) reaches its maximum at ** 2
3
b
s
a
= , which is the market share 
beyond which IMS-s’ incentives to interconnect disappear. We consequently call 
**s the privacy threshold. Note that in our framework the IMS payoff is equivalent 
to combined consumers’ surplus since it is the product of the fraction of 
consumers who use this particular IMS and the level of their utility and since 
using the IMS services incurs no charges. (We do not need to assume, as we 
do here implicitly, that the IMS firms are able to extract all of the consumer 
surplus since nothing changes if we constrain the IMS-s to be only able to 
extract a fixed fraction thereof.) 
 
The schedule of payoff function (3) for different levels of privacy thresholds is 
given in Graph 1 below: 
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Graph 1 
 
Plots of Payoff Functions for Medium, Low and High Levels of Privacy 
Thresholds 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
medium
low
high
Note: the fraction of partial identity revealed is marked on the horizontal axis, the 
vertical axis marks the levels of the payoff functions. The privacy threshold is defined 
as that level of partial identity revealed at which the IMS’s payoff function reaches its 
maximum. 
 
Privacy threshold **s  may or may not exceed the maximum possible amount of 
the provided information services. In the former case consumers are fine with 
the dominant monopolistic IMS (the dotted line in Graph 1 representing 
consumers with low privacy concerns). In contrast, in the latter case the 
disutility effect of revealing private identity starts dominating the utility effect 
before the complete identity is revealed so that the IMS-s find it optimal to stop 
growing at the level of partial identity that is short of complete identity (the 
dashed and normal lines in Graph 1). The greater are consumers’ privacy 
concerns, the smaller the maximum amount of information the IMS-s will find it 
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optimal to stop at soliciting. In Graph 1 above the dashed line corresponds to 
consumers with high privacy concerns, representing the privacy threshold that 
is lower than that of consumers with the medium privacy concerns represented 
by the normal line. 
 
Those IMS firms that are relatively small market participants (commanding 
smaller market shares) would have incentives to interconnect with their larger 
peers, but these incentives will be constrained by the working of the privacy 
concerns effect that gets increasingly stronger once the privacy threshold is 
exceeded. 
 
 
V. Deriving the Optimal Structure of Interconnection 
 
Denote s%  the smallest solution to  
 
( ) 1P s =          (4) 
 
It is socially optimal for the smaller IMS (of size s s< % ) to interconnect to the 
IMS of any size, while only certain size classes will be socially attractive (in 
terms of interconnection) for the IMS firms that are sized in the interval of 
**s s s< <% . Namely, IMS-s in the range [ ]0, 's s− , where 's  is the size of IMS 
that results in the same value of payoff function ( )P s  as the one currently 
enjoyed by the IMS in question. It is easy to see that the closer the IMS firm is 
to size **s  the narrower the size class it would like to choose firms for 
interconnection with. The IMS firms of size greater than **s  will not be willing to 
interconnect with anyone. 
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In this section we investigate which IMS should interconnect with each other in 
order to result in the highest consumer surplus rather than whether the 
interconnection should occur at all. We consider a hypothetical case of three 
IMS firms of sizes is , js  and ks  with the restriction that their sum does not 
exceed unity. The interconnection process may result in an omnipotent IMS 
structure when one single firm provides all of the services and has size 
1i j ks s s+ + = , the structure with two IMS-s one of which is an interconnection of 
( ),i js s , ( ),i ks s  or ( ),j ks s , and a completely fragmented structure which is the 
original structure. The way we judge about the preferability of any one of these 
five outcomes is by looking at the associated payoff and comparing them to 
each other. We first consider the case when both omnipotent and fragmented 
systems are suboptimal relative to the structure where two IMS-s interconnect. 
 
In order to see which type of interconnection delivers the highest value of the 
IMS-s’ joint payoff function, it is sufficient to find the conditions under which 
connecting any given IMS firm (say, size ks ) to any other one of the remaining 
two (say, size is ) is optimal relative to connecting ks  to js . We thus denote 
the corresponding values of the IMS structures’ joint payoff functions as 
( ),P ik j  and ( ),P jk i  and consider their difference: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ), , ,P i j P ik j P jk i∆ = −         (5) 
 
Substituting (3) into (5) yields the following condition for the interconnection 
structure ( ),ik j  to be preferable: 
 
( ) ( )[ ], 2 3 0k j iP i j s s s b a∆ = − − >       (6) 
 
According to the optimality condition (6), the total payoff function will be 
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maximized if IMSk interconnects with the smallest IMS in case privacy 
constraints are binding (that is, if the maximum of payoff function ( )P s , 
** 2
3
b
s
a
= , does not exceed the maximum possible amount of information 
services, which in our framework we normalized to 1. We can thus summarize 
our main finding in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. 
a) Fragmented structure is preferred to an interconnected structure if the 
privacy concerns are large enough (namely, if ( )32 i j
b
s s
a
< + ) 
b) Monopolistic structure is preferred to an interconnected structure if the 
privacy concerns are small enough (namely, if 
( ) ( )
( )
3 3 3
2
1 3 i j i j i j k
i j i j
s s s s s s sb
a s s s s
− + − + +
>
+ − −
). 
(The proof of the above proposition can be found in the Appendix.) 
 
Proposition 2. 
In case of the binding privacy constraints, the following holds: 
a) If an interconnected structure in an original three IMS system is 
preferable to both monopolistic and fragmented structures, for any two 
alternative interconnection structures the one that connects any given 
IMS to the smaller alternative maximizes the total payoff function. 
b) Given the conditions in a) hold, the structure of IMS that interconnects 
two smallest firms will maximize total payoff function. 
(The proof of the above proposition can be found in the Appendix.) 
 
The message of Proposition 2 can be extended to the case of more than three 
IMS firms. Indeed, consider a system of N IMS firms such that, without loss of 
generality, 1 2 ... Ns s s< < < . Consider a subsystem of three IMS firms that 
includes the first smallest two and any third one, say IMS3 sized 3s . Since the 
total payoff function is additive in the payoff functions of individual IMS firms, we 
can consider the subsystem of three IMS-s as a separate entity so that the 
optimal interconnection within this system will imply the optimal interconnection 
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structure for the whole system of N IMS-s. In case of the three systems, 
however, Proposition 2 implies the interconnection between the two smallest 
systems is optimal. We can thus extend Proposition 2 to the following: 
 
Corollary 
In case the IMS structure in which some two of the original IMS firms 
interconnect is preferable to both monopolistic and fragmented structures, 
interconnecting the two smallest IMS firms is optimal. 
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VI. Summary and Policy Implications 
 
In this study we offered a framework for designing a policy for interconnection 
between alternative identity management systems (the IMS-s). We believe the 
scope for such policy stems from the fact that consumers have concerns about 
privacy, that is, the utility gains from acquiring the many services in exchange 
for supply of private information (such as e.g. the credit card or house loan 
services) can be mitigated or even offset by increases in the disutility of 
providing this private information. Our key assumption is that the process of 
interconnection results in the IMS-s sharing the private information on 
consumers they obtain prior to such interconnection, thus increasing their ability 
to extract consumer surplus. Our key finding is that interconnecting the two 
smallest firms with each other is preferable to any other type of interconnection, 
given the interconnected structure is itself preferable to both monopolistic and 
fragmented structures. 
 
Our major policy implication is that the process of soliciting private information 
from individuals by businesses should be regulated since the socially optimal 
outcome may differ from the privately optimal outcome. For example, even if 
interconnecting the two smallest firms in a system of three or more IMS-s 
results in a larger overall consumer surplus, such interconnection is not 
necessarily what either or each one of these firms will find it to do optimal for 
itself. 
 
Second, given the fact that privacy as a measurable concept has not yet been 
defined, we suggest to design a uniform way in which one’s identity can be 
measured and recorded. While realizing that it is impossible to digitize each and 
every element that constitutes the very complex human personality, we believe 
a substantial part of it can and should be, helping to make the design of identity-
related policies based more on rigorous analysis rather than on someone’s 
arbitrary judgment. 
 
We plan to extend this research in several ways. First, we find important to 
derive the conditions under which the divergence of private and social interests 
mentioned above might occur. In other words, we want to know when the 
unregulated process of interconnection will result in the IMS structure that is 
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socially suboptimal. Second, in our framework we postulated the quadratic 
“downward-looking” utility function that depends on the amount of provided 
informational services. Naturally, more general forms of such function should be 
considered in order to render our findings more robust to the functional 
specification. Along the same lines, it appears to be worthwhile to consider the 
case of more than three IMS-s. Third, we assumed that there are no 
externalities to merging two pieces of information, that is, combining these two 
pieces does not reveal anything about any third element of one’s partial identity. 
Finally, an essential assumption in our work is that no two IMS firms provide the 
same kind of informational services to consumers, or equivalently, the 
intersection of the partial identities used by any two IMS-s is an empty set. This 
is clearly not the real-world case since parts of identity like one’s name or age 
are likely to be asked for in most questionnaires. 
 
Keeping all the caveats outlined in the paragraph above in mind, we believe this 
study is a useful step on the way of formalizing the identity-related policy design 
which may help make policy decisions in the area of identity management more 
educated. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
 
Part a: fragmented structure 
Denote ( ),P ij k  the value of total payoff function for the optimal interconnection 
structure, in this case ( ),ij k  without loss of generality. Similarly, ( ), ,P i j k  will 
be the total payoff function’s value in case of the completely fragmented 
structure of IMS. The conditions under which the difference of the former with 
the latter is negative are also the conditions for the fragmented structure to be 
preferable compared to the interconnected one. 
 
( ) ( )
{ } ( )
3 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 3 3 3 2 2 2
, , , 2 2
1 3 3 2
F
i i j i j i i j i j j i j
i j j i j k i j k i j k i j i j
P P ij k P i j k as as s as s bs bs s as s as as s
bs s bs as as as bs bs bs s s s s s as as b
∆ = − = − − − + + − − − +
+ + + + + − − − = + + = = − − +
wherefrom ( )30 2F i j
bP s s
a
∆ < ⇔ < + . 
Part b: monopolistic structure 
 
Similarly to the argument in part a) above, consider the difference 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 3 3 2 2 2, 3 2M i j k i j i j i j i j kP P ij k P ijk a s s s as s s s bs s b s s s a b∆ = − = − + + − + + + + + + −
where ( ),P ij k  is the most preferable interconnection structure. Exploiting the 
fact that the sum of all original IMS systems’s sizes is equal to 1 yields the 
following conditions on the utility function parameters (or on the extent of 
privacy concerns) that ensure the monopolistic structure is optimal: 
( ) ( )
( )
3 3 3
2
1 3
0 i j i j i j kM
i j i j
s s s s s s sbP
a s s s s
− + − + +
∆ < ⇔ >
+ − −
 , which completes the proof. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
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Part a) 
 
Let IMSk consider interconnecting with either IMSi or IMSj. The sizes of these 
IMS-s are ks , is  and js , respectively. Denote the total payoff function for the 
interconnection structure whereby IMSk connects to IMSi as ( ),P ik j . It follows 
from (3) that 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2, i k i k i k j j jP ik j s s a s s b s s s as bs   = + − + + + + − +      (A1) 
Similarly, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2, j k j k j k i i iP jk i s s a s s b s s s as bs   = + − + + + + − +       (A2) 
Expanding the squares and products in (A1) and (A2) yields the following 
expression for the difference between values of total payoff function for the two 
alternative types of the interconnection structure: 
 
( ) ( ) 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
, , 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 2 3 3 2
i k i k i k i k i k
j k j k j k j k j k
k i k i i i i k j k j j j j k
k i k i i j k j j
P P ik j P jk i as s as s bs s as s as s
as s as s bs s as s as s
s as s as bs as as s as s as bs as as s
s as s as bs as s as bs
∆ = − = − − + − − +
+ + − + + =
 = − − + − − + + − + + = 
 = − − + + + − 
( ) ( )2 3 3k i j k i js s s b as a s s
=
 = − − − + 
 (A3) 
Since by definition 1k i js s s= − − , we can rewrite the last expression as: 
 
( )( )2 3k i jP s s s b a∆ = − −        (A4) 
In case of the binding privacy constraints (which is the case of interest 
corresponding to 2 3b a< ) P∆  will be positive if and only if i js s< . In other 
words, the IMSk will prefer to interconnect with IMSi rather than to IMSj if the 
former commands a smaller market share. Shortly, in case of the binding 
privacy constraints interconnecting to a smaller IMS maximizes the total payoff 
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function of the providers of IMS services. 
 
Part b) 
 
Suppose without loss of generality that i j ks s s< <  and ( ),ik j  is an optimal 
structure. That implies ( ) ( ), ,ik j ij kf  in the sense of 0P∆ >  in (A3). The latter 
implies, by the proof of part a) above, that k js s< , which is a contradiction to 
our initial conditions. Similarly, ( ) ( ), , k i i j kjk i ji k s s s s s⇒ < < <f <> . 
 
End of Proof. 
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